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HEALTH LAW
Jonathan M. Joseph*
Adam R. Easterday**
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year, the Commonwealth of Virginia has expe-
rienced numerous developments in health law on all three major
legal fronts-legislative, judicial, and administrative law. These
developments have covered a range of health law topics, including
everything from revisions to the public certificate of need process
for health care facilities and the regulation of body-piercing of
minors on the legislative front, to key decisions regarding the
scope of the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compen-
sation Act' and the Health Care Decisions Act2 on the judicial
front, to action on the regulatory front regarding independent ex-
ternal appeals of health plan denials and hospice care under the
Medicaid program. This article offers a summary of some of the
most significant developments in health law in each of these
three legal arenas during the past year.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The legislature tackled a number of health law issues of impor-
tance in its most recent session. This summary touches on some
of the most important pieces of legislation considered by the leg-
islature, including some items which were defeated or carried
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College; J.D., 1987, Boston University School of Law.
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1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5905 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
2. Id. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
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over until the next legislative session. Among those "hot button"
issues which were considered by the legislature, but not passed
and signed by the Governor, were the right of a patient to sue an
HMO, the confidentiality of medical records, and restrictions on
abortions. These items are included in this article because of their
significance as issues of public policy and as a comparative tool in
assessing Virginia's health law and policy in light of legislative
and regulatory action by both the federal and other state govern-
ments.
A. Public Health Issues
1. Organ Donations
The national system for organ donation, procurement, and allo-
cation is regulated by the federal government.? Virginia, in legis-
lation enacted this year, established requirements for Virginia
hospitals to incorporate the federal guidelines for organ donation,
procurement, and allocation into existing processes for organ do-
nation and procurement.4 Each hospital is now required to estab-
lish an organ donation and procurement protocol that addresses
issues related to compliance with the federal Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration ("HCFA") regulations.5 Each hospital
must also execute "an agreement with an organ procurement or-
ganization designated in HCFA regulations."' This agreement
must provide that the hospital will notify the organization "in a
timely manner of all deaths or imminent deaths of patients in the
hospital" and that the organization "is authorized to determine
the suitability of the decedent or patient for organ donation."7
Additionally, this legislation requires hospitals to collaborate
with organ procurement organizations to inform deceased pa-
tients' families of the option of making or declining to make organ
donations? This process of informing the family must involve
staff appropriately trained in approaching and discussing organ
3. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 121, § 482.45 (1999).
4. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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donation with families of deceased patients.9 All applicable hospi-
tal staff must be educated as to proper procedures for organ dona-
tion, review of deceased patient records with regard to identifying
potential donors, and preservation of the donor while necessary
testing and placement of donated organs is effectuated. 10
The law also clarifies the means and effect of organ donation
declarations or refusals by a patient prior to death and the effect
of such statements after death." Organ donation may now be ex-
pressed in an advance directive, as indicated in the Health Care
Decisions Act,' 2 in addition to the previously allowed document of
gift or documentation on file with the Department of Motor Vehi-
cles.13 The donation is effective upon the death of the donor and
becomes irrevocable at that time-the concurrence or objection of
the family or any other person notwithstanding. 4 Prior to death,
the donor may revoke the gift or donation at any time by follow-
ing the proper procedure for revocation based on the means of the
gift.
1 5
2. Body-Piercing
This year the legislature also tackled the issue of body-piercing
by passing a law aimed at authorizing localities to regulate sani-
tary conditions of establishments that perform body-piercing and
prohibiting the body-piercing of minors except under certain su-
pervised circumstances. 6 Body-piercing is defined as "the act of
penetrating the skin to make a hole, mark, or scar, generally
permanent in nature."" The legislature excluded from this defini-
tion "the use of a mechanized, presterilized ear-piercing system
that penetrates the outer perimeter or lobe of the ear."18
The law makes the act of body-piercing a minor illegal except
when done in the presence of that minor's parent or guardian, or
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. § 32.1-290 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
12. Id. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2993 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
13. Id. § 32.1-290(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
14. Id. § 32.1-290(E) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 18.2-371.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
17. Id.
1. Id.
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when done by or under the supervision of licensed medical per-
sonnel, such as a doctor or registered nurse. 9 A violation of this
prohibition is a Class 2 misdemeanor."
3. Immunizations
In order to promote child immunization and health, the legisla-
ture enacted a measure aimed at reducing barriers to immuniza-
tion.2' To achieve this end, the legislature expanded the means by
which immunizations may be obtained by allowing registered
nurses, in addition to physicians and employees of local health
departments, to administer them to school children.2 2 In addition,
the law eliminates the requirement that a physician or registered
nurse who certifies that public school employees have been tested
for, and are free of, tuberculosis, be an employee of the local
health department.23
4. Abortion
a. Informed Consent Requirements
The legislature failed to pass a proposed law (originally intro-
duced in the House of Delegates) that would have required writ-
ten informed consent from a patient at least twenty-four hours
prior to an abortion being performed.24 The proposed law required
that the physician, or his or her agent, who was to perform the
procedure, obtain the consent no less than twenty-four hours
prior to the procedure.25 The legislation outlined the information
that would have been necessary to constitute "informed" con-
sent.26 This information included: (1) a full, reasonable and un-
derstandable medical explanation of the nature, risks, and bene-
19. Id.
20. Id. A Class 2 misdemeanor is punishable by "confinement in jail for not more than
six months and a fine of no more than $1,000, either or both." Id. § 18.2-11(b) (Repl. Vol.
1996).
21. Id. § 22.1-271.2 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
22. Id. § 22.1-271.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
23. Id. § 22.1-300 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
24. H.B. 1482, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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fits of the procedure and the alternatives to the procedure for that
particular case; (2) instruction to the patient that she may with-
draw consent to the procedure at any time prior to the procedure;
(3) informing the patient that she may speak with the performing
physician and ask any questions and obtain any additional in-
formation about the procedure; (4) a statement of the probable
gestational age of the fetus at the time the procedure is to be per-
formed; and (5) provision of printed materials which provide cer-
tain objective information." The information would have to in-
clude: (1) alternatives to abortion and community resource
information regarding adoption, paternity establishment and
child support enforcement, child rearing, pediatric and maternal
health care among other areas; (2) the nature of the abortion pro-
cedure and techniques used in the procedure; and (3) the nature
of fetal development and characteristics of the fetus throughout
pregnancy. 8 The proposed law did make an exception for abor-
tions required in a medical emergency to save the life of the
mother or to prevent substantial and irreversible impairment of a
bodily function of the mother.29 The law proposed a civil fine of
$2,500 upon any physician who failed to comply with the re-
quirements of the law.3°
b. "Unlawful Abortion"
A similar bill was introduced in the Senate that required writ-
ten informed consent in abortion cases and, in addition, added
provisions related to the crime of "unlawful abortion."31 The crime
of "unlawful abortion" was to be a violation of Virginia Code sec-
tion 18.2-76, which contains the written informed consent re-
quirement as contained in both the House and Senate legisla-
tion.32 The bill would have vested jurisdiction over a trial
involving allegations of a violation of the written informed con-
sent requirement in the general district courts.3
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. S.B. 781, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
32. Id.; Va. H.B. 1482.
33. See Va. S.B. 781; Va. H.B. 1482.
200]
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B. Patient Rights and Protection Issues
1. Consent to Treatment and Transport of Minors in an
Emergency
The legislature modified the statute with regard to the consent
to treatment of minors to allow for certain exceptional circum-
stances.34 The revised statute now allows for transport of a minor
by emergency personnel without consent where a delay in trans-
porting the minor from the scene of an accident, fire, or other
emergency prior to hospital admission may adversely effect the
minor's health.35
As written, the law states that a person authorized to give con-
sent must not be available within a reasonable period of time un-
der the circumstances. 6 If the person authorized to give consent
can be reached in a reasonable period of time, consent should still
be obtained." The emergency personnel making the judgment to
transport without consent are afforded immunity from suit for
any liability arising from such lack of consent.38
One exception to the above-noted rule is made for minors aged
fourteen or older.39 The law allows that consent of such a minor
who is physically capable of giving the consent must be obtained
prior to transport or treatment.4 °
2. Medical Records
a. Release Authorization
A new law will lessen the practical burdens of obtaining medi-
cal record releases by patients.4' The new law will allow health
care providers to treat as an original document any photocopy,
facsimile reproduction, or other form of copy of a signed original
34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2969 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
35. Id. § 54.1-2969(C) (Cure. Supp. 2000).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 54.1-2969(D) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
39. Id. § 54.1-2969(C) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
40. Id.
41. Id. § 8.01-413 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
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consent to release of medical records.42 This law will reduce the
burdens on patients attempting to obtain release of their own
medical records, as well as ease the burden on providers by al-
lowing more efficient means for transmission of consents to re-
lease of records by not always requiring that a signed original
release be obtained.
b. Mental Health Records of Minors
The legislature carried over for consideration in the next legis-
lative session a measure that would have allowed mental health
care providers to refuse to release the records of a minor.4" This
proposed law would require that if the provider is of the opinion
that the release of the records would not be in the best interest of
the child's course of treatment, then the provider could refuse dis-
closure." The bill did provide for a petition by a parent to the Ju-
venile and Domestic Relations District Court for access to the re-
cords.4" In such an event, a guardian ad litem would be appointed
on behalf of the minor and the court would be required to conduct
an in camera review of the records to determine if nondisclosure
was, in fact, in the best interest of the child.46
c. Confidentiality of Records in Disease Investigation
The legislature also failed to take action on a bill regarding the
protection of the confidentiality of medical records examined in
the course of an investigation of a communicable disease.47 The
bill proposed amendments to Virginia Code section 32.1-41 re-
garding the preservation of anonymity of providers and patients
involved in an investigation of a communicable disease by the
Commissioner of Health.' The amendments would have prohib-
ited the Commissioner from divulging the identity of any patients
with noncommunicable diseases if pertinent to an investigation,
42. Id. § 8.01-413(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000).
43. H.B. 46, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. H.B. 604, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
48. Id.
20001
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research, or study unless the Commissioner had the written con-
sent of the patient (or the patient's parent or guardian) or a court
order allowing the disclosure.49 The proposed law did allow the
Commissioner to divulge (at his discretion) the identity of persons
with communicable diseases and the practitioners involved with
the investigation, study, or research."0
3. Advance Directives
a. Inappropriate/Unethical Directives
The legislature passed a measure which requires physicians,
who have determined that the wishes of a patient, as expressed in
a written advance directive or through an appointed health care
decision-maker (or proxy), are unethical or medically inappropri-
ate, to make reasonable efforts to inform the patient or the pa-
tient's proxy of such a determination and the reasons for the de-
termination. 1 Furthermore, if the situation cannot be resolved,
the physician is required to make reasonable efforts to transfer
the patient to another physician who is willing to comply with the
terms of the directive.52
The objecting physician must allow a minimum of fourteen
days for the transfer of the patient to the care of another physi-
cian who is willing to comply with the terms of the directive. 3
The transferring physician must continue to provide the patient
with life-sustaining care that is reasonably available to the pa-
tient. 4 The physician is not, however, required to provide any
treatment that he is not physically or legally capable of provid-
ing." The law defines "life-sustaining care" as "any ongoing medi-
cal treatment that utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to
sustain, restore or supplant a spontaneous vital function, includ-
ing hydration, nutrition, maintenance medication, and cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation."56
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
52. Id. § 54.1-2990(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 54.1-2990(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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b. Promotion of Awareness of Use of Advance Directives
The legislature also approved a joint resolution to encourage
public education on the use of advance directives. 7 The legisla-
tive resolution, observing the benefits of advance directives, calls
upon the Virginia Board of Medicine, the Medical Society of Vir-
ginia, the Virginia Health Care Association, the Virginia Hospital
and Healthcare Association, and other professional health care
associations to encourage their members to promote their aware-
ness and use.58 The legislature suggested that these associations
achieve this goal by including such topics as end-of-life issues and
advance directives in their continuing education programs, pro-
mote discussion of such issues in their treatment protocols, and
collaborate to develop and implement procedures to allow effec-
tive transfer of advance directive documentation among health
care practitioners and facilities.59
The legislature also called upon the Virginia State Bar and the
Virginia Bar Association to support these activities by preparing
educational materials and offering assistance in these areas.6 °
4. Health Maintenance Organization Liability
The Virginia legislature declined to follow the trend of a hand-
ful of other states in establishing a cause of action against health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs") for liability for health care
decisions. 61 A proposed law would have established a requirement
that a managed care health insurance plan be liable for the
health care treatment decisions of the plan.62 The proposed law
established a cause of action for damages resulting from an
HMO's failure to exercise ordinary care in making a health care
treatment decision.63 The proposed law allowed for the filing of
57. See H.J. Res. 242, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. A handful of states have passed laws which allow a patient to sue his HMO di-
rectly for injuries suffered as a result of health care decisions the IMO made. Managed
Health Care Insurance Accountability Act of 1999, ch. 536, 1999 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 536
(Deering); Act of Apr. 22, 1999, ch. 281, 1999 Ga. Laws 281; Act of May 22, 1997, ch. 163,
1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 163.
62. H.B. 92, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
63. Id.
2000]
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suit directly in lieu of using the utilization review grievance proc-
ess of the health plan.'
C. Health Care Professions, Providers, and Facilities
1. Certificate of Public Need for Health Care Facilities
a. Review Process for Certificate of Public Need
New legislation aimed at making the certificate of public need
process more efficient and making other technical changes be-
came law.65 Among the changes made by the new law are: (1)
changing the time frame for review of an application by the
Commissioner from fifteen days to forty-five days;66 (2) allowance
for the application to be deemed approved if the Commissioner
has not made a decision within seventy days of the closing of the
record;67 (3) elimination of the requirement that the Commis-
sioner refund fifty percent of the application fee if a decision is
not made within forty-five days;" and (4) allowing an applicant to
petition for injunctive relief if the Commissioner has made no de-
cision within forty-five days of the application.69
b. Deregulation of Certificate of Public Need Process
The second piece of legislation dealing with the certificate of
public need process calls for the phase-out of the process by July
1, 2004.0 The law requires the Joint Commission on Health Care
to establish a plan of deregulation.7' The plan must be submitted
to the 2001 General Assembly and approved by that body.
72
The law requires that a deregulation plan include: (1) a plan to
meet the health care needs of uninsured and indigent citizens; (2)
64. Id.
65. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.6 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
66. Id. § 32.1-102.6(E)(6) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
67. Id. § 32.1-102.6(E)(7) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
68. Id. § 32.1-102.6(E)(8) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 32.1-102.13 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
71. Id. § 32.1-102.13(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000)
72. Id. § 32.1-102.13(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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a provision of adequate oversight of the various deregulated
services to protect public health and safety and promote quality of
health services provided by deregulated health facilities and proj-
ects; (3) a monitoring plan for assessing the effects of deregula-
tion on the number and location of medical facilities and projects
in the Commonwealth; (4) the recommendation of appropriate
regulations for nursing homes, certified nursing facilities, inter-
mediate care facilities, extended care facilities, long-term care fa-
cilities and new hospitals with respect to requirements for deter-
mination of need for such facilities; (5) a schedule of recom-
mended and required statutory changes to effectuate the deregu-
lation plan; and (6) an assessment of deregulation upon the
unique role of academic medical centers. 3 The Commission is also
charged with assessing the fiscal impact of this deregulation on
the state's health care financing programs.7 4
2. Practitioners' Scope of Practice
a. Physician Assistants
The scope of practice of physician assistants has been expanded
by a new law that allows physicians to delegate to physician as-
sistants the responsibility for conducting initial evaluation and
ongoing treatment of patients in hospitals.75 This provision in-
cludes evaluation and treatment in an emergency department of
a hospital by a physician assistant.76 In treating or evaluating a
patient, the physician assistant is required to "report any acute or
significant finding or change in a patient's clinical status to the
supervising physician as soon as circumstances require."77 The
physician assistant is required to record any such findings in the
patient's medical record.78 The physician assistant must also
transfer, to the supervising physician, the direct care of any pa-
tient in an emergency department who has a life-threatening in-
jury or illness. 9
73. Id. § 32.1-102.13(C) (Cure. Supp. 2000).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 54.1-2952(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
20001
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The law also places requirements upon the supervising physi-
cian. ° The supervising physician must review, prior to a patient's
discharge, the services rendered by the physician assistant in the
emergency department.8 ' When the physician assistant is prac-
ticing in an emergency department, the supervising physician
must be present in the facility to supervise the physician assis-
tant. 2 A physician responsible for the care of the patient must
sign a protocol agreeing to act as a supervising physician for the
physician assistant practicing in the hospital.83
b. Nurse Practitioners
Nurse practitioners' ability to prescribe drugs has been ex-
panded by law.84 The law now allows nurse practitioners, in a se-
ries of staggered effective dates from July 1, 2000 through July 1,
2003, to prescribe drugs that belong to Schedules III through VI.85
Prior to this enactment, nurse practitioners were only permitted
to prescribe Schedule VI drugs.86
The law also eliminates certain regulations regarding the pre-
scriptive authority of nurse practitioners and the responsibility of
the Boards of Nursing and Medicine with regard to regulating
this authority.8 7 Instead, the law substitutes requirements for
these Boards to develop joint regulations regarding the assess-
ment and review of nurse practitioner competency to prescribe
drugs.88 The Boards of Medicine and Nursing are also required to
"promote ethical practice, an appropriate standard of care, pa-
tient safety, the use of new pharmaceuticals, and appropriate
communication with patients." 9
The new law also requires the Joint Commission on Health
Care to examine the effects of nurse practitioner prescriptive
authority and report upon the impact of this authority with re-
gard to patient care quality, provider relationships, third-party
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. § 54.1-2952(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
84. Id. § 54.1-2957.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
85. Id. For information regarding the classifications of drugs by Schedule, see VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-3443 to -3456 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
86. Id. § 54.1-2957.01(A) (Repl. Vol. 1998).
87. Id. § 54.1-2957.01(C) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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reimbursement, physician practices, and patient satisfaction."
The Joint Commission is required to file a preliminary report
with committees of the House and Senate by July 1, 2003.9"
c. Utilization Review Medical Directors
Virginia joined a growing number of states in passing a law re-
quiring the medical director of a utilization review agency to be
licensed as a physician in the state in which the utilization re-
view agency is being licensed.9 2 The new law requires the medical
director of a utilization review organization, which is itself li-
censed in Virginia, to be licensed in the Commonwealth as well.93
In addition, the law clarifies existing definitions and licensing re-
quirements for "physician advisors" and "peer of a treating health
care provider" under the statutes governing utilization review ac-
tivities in the Commonwealth.94 These individuals are not re-
quired to be licensed by Virginia per se, but must be licensed ei-
ther by Virginia or by the licensing authority of some other state
or commonwealth of the United States.95
d. Midwives
A proposed law to establish licensure and regulation of mid-
wives and the practice of midwifery was carried over until the
next legislative session.96 In addition, the suggested law con-
tained a number of unrelated technical amendments to various
other laws. 7
The law defines "midwifery" as the "assessment and care of a
pregnant woman and her newborn during pregnancy, labor, birth
and the postpartum period outside of a hospital."" The proposed
law establishes licensing, training, and educational requirements
90. Id. § 54.1-2957.01 editor's note (Cur. Supp. 2000).
9L Id.
92. Id. § 32.1-137.7 (Cum. Supp. 2000); see also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334B-2
(1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-83-31 (1999).
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-137.7 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. S.B. 657, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000).
97. Id.
98. Id.
20001
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for midwives.99 The law would place responsibility for the regula-
tion of midwifery under the Board of Health Professions.'00 The
Board would be responsible for promulgating regulations to en-
force the provisions of the law.'0 '
The law establishes particular requirements with regard to the
practice of midwifery and informed consent.0 2 A midwife would
be required to obtain written, informed consent from a patient.0 3
The consent must demonstrate the patient's understanding of,
and consent to, the care of a midwife."° The consent form is spe-
cifically required to show the background and training of the
midwife, a description of the arrangement for physician support
and assistance, the level of malpractice or liability insurance of
the midwife, and a description of the patient's right to file (as well
as the process for doing so) a complaint with the Board of Health
Professions.'0 5
3. Duties to Report/Inform
a. Adult Protective Services
A new law requires that "each nursing home and certified
nursing facility train all employees who are mandated to report
adult abuse, neglect, or exploitation pursuant to [Virginia Code
section] 63.1-55.3 on such reporting procedures and the conse-
quences for failing to make a required report."0 6 Virginia Code
section 63.1-55.3 requires health care professionals, practitioners,
and employees whose duties include full or part-time care of
adults to file these reports.'
b. Mental Health Providers
A new law now requires mental health providers to advise any
patient whom the provider believes may have been the victim of a
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127(B)(10) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
107. Id. § 63.1-55.3 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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violation of standards of conduct by another mental health pro-
vider of the patient's right to make a complaint to the Depart-
ment of Health Professions.0 8 The mental health provider shall
provide the patient with information on how to contact the De-
partment to lodge a complaint, including the Department's toll-
free telephone number for registering a complaint.' °9
The suspecting mental health provider must also make a rec-
ord of the reasonable suspicions in the patient's record and in-
clude a description of the alleged misconduct, including informa-
tion as to the licensure of the suspected provider and the dates of
treatment involved."0 The suspecting provider must also docu-
ment his conversation with the patient during which the provider
informs the patient of his rights as required by the law."'
According to the requirements of the law, the mental health
provider who has such suspicions and acts will be shielded from
any civil or criminal liability unless the provider acted mali-
ciously or in bad faith."2 The failure to inform the patient of his
rights as required under the law can subject the provider to a
civil penalty of up to $100."'
D. Health Insurance
1. Medical Assistance Services
A new law makes numerous adjustments to medical assistance
service overpayment appeals and the periodic surveys of the
Commissioner of Health to certify nursing facilities for reim-
bursement under federal programs (i.e., Medicare and Medi-
caid). 4
The law establishes that the periodic survey determinations of
the Commissioner of Health constitute case decisions under the
Administrative Process Act" 5 and are thus subject to administra-
108. Id. § 54.1-2400.4(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
109. Id. § 54.1-2400.4(B) (Cure. Supp. 2000).
110. Id.
11L Id.
112. Id. § 54.1-2400.4(C) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
113. Id. § 54.1-2400.4D) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
114. Id. § 32.1-126 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
115. Id. §§ 9-6.14:1 to -6.14-25 (Repl. Vol. 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
2000]
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tive appeal."6 In addition, the survey findings will also be subject
to judicial review." 7 The Commissioner of Health is to monitor
the effects of these changes and report to the Joint Commission
on Health Care regarding the types of survey deficiencies ap-
pealed, the reasons for the finding of deficiencies, any federal ac-
tions taken as a result of the finding of deficiencies, any effects on
patient care, and the costs to the Commonwealth of the appeals of
such deficiencies.1
8
The other section of this law deals with medical assistance
service overpayment appeals." 9 Such appeals under the Virginia
Medicaid program are to be determined within 180 days of the
appeal request. 2 ° Failure to make an initial determination within
this timeframe results in a presumption that the decision is in fa-
vor of the provider.' 2' A hearing officer is to make a determination
within 120 days and forward a recommendation to the Director of
the Department of Medical Assistance Services.'22 The Director
then must adopt the recommendation within sixty days unless
the decision would be an error of law or violate Department pol-
icy. 23 The Director must explain any rejection of the determina-
tion of the hearing officer.'24
No recovery of funds is allowed prior to the final decision, but
interest on the disputed amount will accrue from the date of the
final determination.'25 The burden of proof in such an appeal
shall be placed upon the provider to show entitlement to the
funds and, should he prevail, a provider may recover attorney's
fees.1
26
2. Health Insurance for Children
The Virginia Children's Medical Security Insurance Plan
116. Id. § 32.1-126(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
117. Id.
118. Id. § 32.1-126 editor's note (Gum. Supp. 2000).
119. Id. § 32.1-325.1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
120. Id. § 32.1-325.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 32.1-325.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 32.1-325.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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("CMSIP") was revised and renamed by a new law as the Family
Access to Medical Insurance Security ("FAMIS"). 27 FAMIS pro-
vides medical insurance to individuals under the age of nineteen
who meet the following criteria: (1) individual's family income is
at or below 200% of the federal poverty level; (2) individual is not
eligible for medical assistance services under title XIX of the So-
cial Security Act, as amended; (3) individual is not covered by a
group health plan or health insurance coverage; and (4) individ-
ual has been without health insurance for at least six months.
12
Participants in the FAMIS program who fall between 100% and
200% of the federal poverty level are required to participate on a
limited cost-sharing basis. 29 There is no cost-sharing required for
well-child and preventative health care services. 3 °
The law requires that the plan provide comprehensive bene-
fits. 1 1 These benefits include medical, dental, vision, mental
health and substance abuse services, physical therapy, occupa-
tional therapy, speech-language pathology, and skilled nursing
services for special education students. 32 FAMIS participants
with access to employer-sponsored health insurance may enroll in
an employer-sponsored plan and receive supplemental insurance
up to the level of benefits provided for FAMIS beneficiaries.
33
FAMIS will make premium payments to the employer-sponsored
plan so long as the plan is determined to be cost-effective. 34
The FAMIS provisions will not become effective until approved
by the federal Health Care Financing Administration.
1 5
3. Uniform Managed Care Referral Form
The legislature directed that a uniform form be developed for
managed care referrals in a recently passed law. 3 6 The law di-
rects the State Corporation Commission to develop a uniform re-
127. See id. § 32.1-351 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
128. Id. § 32.1-351(A) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
129. Id. § 32.1-351(B) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
130. Id.
131. Id. § 32.1-351(C) (Cur. Supp. 2000).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 32.1-351(D) (Cum. Supp. 2000).
134. Id.
135. Id. § 32.1-351 editor's note (Cum. Supp. 2000).
136. Id. § 38.2-3407.4:1 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
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ferral form to be used by all managed care health insurance
plans.'37 The form must incorporate only the data elements
adopted by the Health Care Financing Administration for its
Electronic Data Interchange standards.3 ' The form is to be used
by any managed care health insurance plan that requires its in-
sureds or participants to obtain a referral in writing prior to re-
ceiving any consultation services.3 9 A managed care plan may not
require additional referral forms or require modification of the
uniform referral form as a condition of coverage. 4 °
III. JuDIcIAL DEVELOPMENTS
This section of the article reviews decisions of Virginia courts
that touch upon important health law concepts. Several of these
decisions do not directly turn on points of health law. But none-
theless, the holdings of these cases have significant effect upon a
variety of aspects of health law. Among these rulings are deci-
sions affecting the evidentiary rules governing health and medi-
cal records, the scope of workers' compensation and the rules gov-
erning the application of workers' compensation benefits, and the
definition and proofs required with regard to certain medical-
legal issues such as the insanity defense. The cases summarized
here have been organized by court of decision.
A. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia
1. Fruiterman v. Waziri'
The Supreme Court of Virginia declined to extend the immu-
nity protections of the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act' to a professional corporation in Fruiterman
v. Waziri." The case involved a suit by parents of an infant who
died from brain damage suffered during delivery.' Plaintiff al-
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 259 Va. 540, 525 S.E.2d 552 (2000).
142. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
143. Fruiterman, 259 Va. at 545, 525 S.E.2d at 554 (2000).
144. Id. at 542, 525 S.E.2d at 553.
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leged medical malpractice and wrongful death and sued the indi-
vidual physician and the professional corporation for which the
plaintiff practiced.'45 The lower court sustained the demurrer of
the individual physician, but denied that of the co-defendant pro-
fessional corporation. 46 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed
the decision of the lower court. 47
The Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act provides immunity to "participating physician" and "partici-
pating hospital" providers from civil actions for birth-related neu-
rological injuries.' The court noted that the definitions of these
two terms were specific and narrow and did not include the pro-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 545, 525 S.E.2d at 555.
148. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000). As
codified during Fruiterman v. Waziri, the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act defines "participating physician" as
a physician licensed in Virginia to practice medicine, who practices obstetrics
or performs obstetrical services either full or part time or, as authorized in
the plan of operation, a licensed nurse-midwife who performs obstetrical
services, either full or part time, within the scope of such licensure and who
at the time of the injury (i) had in force an agreement with the Commissioner
of Health or his designee, in a form prescribed by the Commissioner, whereby
the physician agreed to participate in the development of a program to pro-
vide obstetrical care to patients eligible for Medical Assistance Services and
to patients who are indigent, and upon approval of such program by the
Commissioner of Health, to participate in its implementation, (ii) had in force
an agreement with the Board of Medicine whereby the physician agreed to
submit to review by the Board of Medicine as required by subsection B of §
38.2-5004, and (iii) had paid the participating physician assessment pursuant
to § 38.2-5020 for the period of time in which the birth-related neurological
injury occurred.
Id. § 5001 (Repl. Vol. 1999). The Act defines a "participating hospital" as
a hospital licensed in Virginia which at the time of the injury (i) had in force
an agreement with the Commissioner of Health or his designee, in a form
prescribed by the Commissioner, whereby the hospital agreed to participate
in the development of a program to provide obstetrical care to patients eligi-
ble for Medical Assistance Services and to patients who are indigent, and
upon approval of such program by the Commissioner of Health, to participate
in its implementation, (ii) had in force an agreement with the State Depart-
ment of Health whereby the hospital agreed to submit to review of its obstet-
rical service, as required by subsection C of§ 38.2-5004, and (iii) had paid the
participating hospital assessment pursuant to § 38.2-5020 for the period of
time in which the birth-related neurological injury occurred. The term also
includes employees of such hospitals, excluding physicians or nurse-midwives
who are eligible to qualify as participating physicians, acting in the course of
and in the scope of their employment.
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fessional corporation employing a "participating physician."'49
Recently, the legislature acted to change the law in response to
this decision by expanding the definition of the terms in the stat-
ute to include a professional corporation.5 0
2. Mercer v. Commonwealth'5'
In Mercer v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the question of whether polysubstance dependence
("PSD") constitutes "mental illness" as that term is defined in the
statute regarding civil commitment.'52 In this case, the appellant
was found not guilty by reason of insanity on charges of car-
jacking, grand larceny, maiming and robbery.15 Subsequently,
the appellant was committed to the custody of the Department of
Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Service
for inpatient care.'54 At a hearing to determine whether the com-
mitment should continue, two expert witnesses, while agreeing
that appellant suffered from PSD, disagreed as to whether she
was "mentally ill" as that term is defined under Virginia Code
section 37.1-1.' The lower court held that PSD did fall within
the definition of mental illness under Virginia Code section 37.1-
1.156 The supreme court affirmed this determination. 15 7
The supreme court noted in its decision that while the lan-
guage of Virginia Code section 37.1-1 does not expressly address
the issue of whether PSD qualifies as a mental illness for condi-
tional release purposes, when read in conjunction with other ap-
plicable and related code provisions (such as Virginia Code sec-
tions 19.2-182.3 and 182.5), the implication is clear that PSD is a
mental illness under the law.158 The court reinforced the notion
that the issue of whether an acquittee under the NGRI provision
suffers a mental illness is a question of fact for the trial court to
149. Fruiterman, 259 Va. at 544, 525 S.E.2d at 554.
150. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
151. 259 Va. 235, 523 S.E.2d 213 (2000).
152. Id. at 237, 523 S.E.2d at 214.
153. Id. at 238, 523 S.E.2d at 214.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 238-39, 523 S.E.2d at 214-15.
156. Id. at 239, 523 S.E.2d at 215.
157. Id. at 242, 523 S.E.2d at 217.
158. Id. at 241, 523 S.E.2d at 216.
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be resolved by considering the testimony of mental health experts
and the relevant provisions of the law. 15 9
3. Gilmore v. Finn60
In Gilmore v. Finn, a key case concerning end-of-life health
care and advance directives, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
on the issue of whether the intervention of Governor Gilmore to
halt the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures was reasonable
so as to prevent the patient's family, which prevailed on the mer-
its of the case, from recovering fees and sanctions.'6 '
In 1995, Hugh Finn was injured in an automobile accident and
left in a persistent vegetative state and required artificial nutri-
tion and hydration.'62 His wife decided to remove the artificial
hydration and nutrition.'63 In the initial suit, brought by another
family member in chancery to obtain an injunction against the
removal of life-sustaining procedures, the trial court denied the
injunction because the withdrawal was deemed medically appro-
priate and ethical.' 6 ' The Governor initiated suit under Virginia
Code sections 2.1-49 and 54.1-2986.16' The Governor's contention
was that withdrawal of the procedures would result in the death
of Finn and constitute euthanasia in violation of the provisions of
Virginia Code section 54.1-2990.6 The trial court denied the
159. Id. at 242, 523 S.E.2d at 217.
160. 259 Va. 448, 527 S.E.2d 426 (2000).
161. Id. at 466-67, 527 S.E.2d at 436.
162. Id. at 453, 527 S.E.2d at 428.
163. Id.
164 Id. at 454, 527 S.E.2d at 428.
165. Id. at 457-58, 527 S.E.2d at 430-31. Virginia Code section 2.1-49 grants the Gover-
nor authority, by suit or other action, to act to protect the interests or legal rights of the
Commonwealth or its citizens. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-49 (Repl. Vol. 1995). The law allows
the Governor to institute suit on behalf of its citizens acting in capacity of parens patriae
where the Governor believes that existing legal procedures fail to adequately protect the
rights or interests of citizens. Id. The Governor also cited Virginia Code section 54.1-
2986(E) which grants the court authority to enjoin any action not found by preponderance
of the evidence to have been lawfully authorized. Id. § 54.1-2986(E) (Repl. Vol. 1998 &
Cum. Supp. 2000).
166. Finn, 259 Va. at 458, 527 S.E.2d at 431. Virginia Code section 54.1-2990 states:
Nothing in this article shall be construed to require a physician to prescribe
or render medical treatment to a patient that the physician determines to be
medically or ethically inappropriate. However, in such a case, if the physi-
cian's determination is contrary to the terms of an advance directive of a
qualified patient or the treatment decision of a person designated to make
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Governor's request for an injunction and the supreme court de-
nied an emergency appeal for review.167
Subsequently, the life-sustaining procedures were removed and
Finn died.16 Michelle Finn, his wife, moved for attorney's fees,
costs, and sanctions under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1.169
The trial court awarded $13,124.20 in compensatory damages. 17
The Governor appealed and the supreme court accepted review of
the matter.17 ' The supreme court then determined that while the
Governor could not reasonably believe that Finn was not in a per-
sistent vegetative state, he could reasonably believe that the pro-
visions of Virginia Code section 54.1-2990 might be applicable to
Finn, notwithstanding the provisions of Virginia Code section
54.1-2986.172 Thus, the Governor's argument was warranted in
law and the trial court erred in awarding sanctions. 73
In deciding this case, the supreme court addressed the issue of
the tension between the two above-noted sections regarding end-
of-life care and withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. 74 While
ruling that the reasonableness of the Governor's action in ad-
vancing a legal theory regarding the application of Virginia Code
section 54.1-2990 did not allow for the sanctions the trial court
imposed for violation of Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1, the su-
preme court stated its opinion that the Governor's contention was
ultimately incorrect even if it was not without merit.175 In doing
so, the supreme court rebuffed the Governor's contention that the
the decision under this article or a Durable Do Not Resuscitate Order, the
physician shall make a reasonable effort to inform the patient or the patient's
designated decision-maker of such determination and the reasons for the de-
termination. If the conflict remains unresolved, the physician shall make a
reasonable effort to transfer the patient to another physician.
Nothing in this article shall be construed to condone, authorize or approve
mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or
omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
167. Finn, 259 Va. at 459-60, 527 S.E.2d at 432.
168. Id. at 460, 527 S.E.2d at 432.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 462, 527 S.E.2d at 433.
171. Id. at 463, 527 S.E.2d at 434-35.
172. Id. at 463-69, 527 S.E.2d at 433-37.
173. Id. at 468, 527 S.E.2d at 437.
174. Id. at 467, 527 S.E.2d at 436.
175. Id.
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withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition measures would
initiate the process of dying rather than merely permit the natu-
ral process of dying for a patient in a persistent vegetative
state.176 The former would of course constitute euthanasia under
the statute while the latter would be an allowable termination of
a life sustaining procedure.
177
4. Smyth County Community Hospital v. Town of Marion78
In Smyth County Community Hospital v. Town of Marion, the
Supreme Court of Virginia overturned a lower court ruling and
found that a tax exemption for a hospital applied to a nursing
home owned and operated by the hospital despite the fact that
the nursing home maintained a separate license and separate re-
porting forms.
From 1993 through 1995, Smyth County and the Town of
Marion levied tax assessments against the nursing home for real
and personal property taxes. 80 In 1996, the hospital filed suit for
declaratory judgment and relief from the assessments.' The trial
court found that the nursing home was not tax exempt under the
aegis of the hospital's tax exemption under Virginia Code section
58.1-3606(A)(5). 182
On appeal, the supreme court reversed and remanded the
case.'8 The supreme court stressed in its decision that, while tax
exemptions should be narrowly construed, the record as a whole
must be examined to establish whether or not the exemption ap-
plies.' 8 In this case, the supreme court found that the nursing
home was property of the hospital which immediately and di-
rectly promoted the charitable purpose of the hospital. 85 The su-
preme court, in reaching this conclusion, considered the following
factors significant: (1) the hospital's articles of incorporation
176. Id.
177. See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
178. 259 Va. 328, 527 S.E.2d 401 (2000).
179. Id. at 336-37, 527 S.E.2d at 405-06.
180. Id. at 331, 527 S.E.2d at 402.
18L Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 337, 527 S.E.2d at 405-06.
184. Id. at 333-34, 527 S.E.2d at 403-04.
185. Id. at 335, 527 S.E.2d at 404-05.
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listed the maintenance of medical facilities of all descriptions, in-
cluding those for "nursing services," among its purposes; (2) the
hospital owned the nursing home and operated it as a wholly-
owned subsidiary; (3) the nursing home was governed by the hos-
pital board of directors; (4) all of the nursing home staff were em-
ployed by the hospital; (5) the nursing home and hospital were a
single entity on a consolidated financial report; and (6) the nurs-
ing home utilized the hospital financial accounts for payment of
expenses and revenue collection.'86 The supreme court also noted
that the property will be tax exempt if it directly and immediately
promotes the purposes of the hospital.'87 Based on these two fac-
tors-indicia of ownership and dominant purpose of the prop-
erty-the court concluded that the nursing home was tax exempt
as property of the hospital.' 8
5. Carter v. Chesterfield County Health Commission'89
In Carter v. Chesterfield County Health Commission, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed a lower court holding that
stated a county health commission was a municipal corporation
and entitled to sovereign immunity.9 ' The case involved a suit by
the administrator of a deceased's estate alleging negligent acts by
employees of the Health Commission in treating or failing to treat
the decedent in the Health Commission's operation of a nursing
home.' 9' The Health Commission had filed a special plea of sover-
eign immunity and the trial court dismissed the action against
the Health Commission. 92
In reviewing the case, the supreme court found that the Com-
mission was performing a governmental function, not a proprie-
tary one, because the operation of the nursing home was an exer-
cise of police power for the common good.'93
186. Id. at 331-34, 527 S.E.2d at 402-04.
187. Id. at 336, 527 S.E.2d at 405.
188. Id. at 337, 527 S.E.2d at 405-06.
189. 259 Va. 588, 527 S.E.2d 783 (2000).
190. Id. at 594, 527 S.E.2d at 787.
191. Id. at 590, 527 S.E.2d at 784.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 594, 527 S.E.2d at 787.
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B. Decisions from the Virginia Court of Appeals
1. Matthews v. Commonwealth94
In Matthews v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals
ruled that a hospital patient does not have an expectation of pri-
vacy in a hospital emergency ward treatment room and, there-
fore, the police may enter the room without a warrant and with-
out violating the Fourth Amendment protections against
unlawful searches and seizures.'95 The appellant in the case was
attempting to overturn his conviction for capital murder on the
grounds that the police had obtained evidence against him ille-
gally while he received treatment in the hospital emergency
room.'96 The court of appeals distinguished this case from cases
involving private hospital rooms (where a warrant is required). 9 '
2. Smith v. Commonwealth
198
At issue in Smith v. Commonwealth was the admission, over
appellant's objection, of hospital records regarding appellant's
blood alcohol content at the time the hospital admitted him.'99
Appellant had been in an automobile accident."0 The basis of the
objection was that the records were unsubstantiated and thus
hearsay.20 ' In affirming the trial court ruling, the court of appeals
applied the modern Shopbook rule analysis to the issue of the
admissibility of the medical records.0 2 This rule is a "business re-
cord" exception to the exclusion of hearsay evidence. 20 3 The rule
allows the admission of hospital records without need for authen-
tication if the records are: (1) made and maintained in the ordi-
nary course of business; (2) relied upon to treat and care for pa-
194. 30 Va. App. 412, 517 S.E.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1999).
195. Id. at 413, 517 S.E.2d at 263.
196. Id. at 414, 517 S.E.2d at 263.
197. Id. at 414, 517 S.E.2d at 264 (distinguishing Morris v. Commonwealth, 208 Va.
331, 157 S.E.2d 191 (1967)).
198. No. 2332-98-2, 2000 Va. App. LEXIS 151 (Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2000) (unpublished
decision).
199. Id. at *2.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *4.
202. Id. at *4-7.
203. Id. at *4.
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tients; and (3) verified by witnesses to have been made by
authorized persons at or near the time of the event recorded."4
3. Turpin v. Fairfax County School Board.°.
In Turpin v. Fairfax County School Board, the Virginia Court
of Appeals affirmed a ruling of the Workers' Compensation Com-
mission.206 Therein, plaintiff Turpin argued she was entitled to
select another physician after her treating doctor refused to treat
her.0 7 The Workers' Compensation Commission denied Turpin's
claim. 2 8
The court of appeals held that the issue of whether a treating
physician has released or abandoned a patient is determined by
the express intent of the physician, which the trier of fact deter-
mines by clear and convincing evidence.20 9 In the instant case, the
court of appeals found that the factual finding of the Commission
was supported by such evidence and that there was no basis for
reversing the Commission's finding.210
C. Decisions from the Lower Courts
Marks v. Bowers211 is a significant circuit court decision worth
noting. In that case, the Henrico County Circuit Court held that a
plaintiff seeking damages for personal injuries cannot admit into
evidence medical and health expenses which have been written
off and not charged to the plaintiff.212 The circuit court further
held that these expenses could not be included in the collateral
source rule.213 The circuit court reasoned that the reimbursement
of a provider is not payment of medical expenses to the plaintiff
204. Id. at *5-6.
205. No. 2933-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 614 (Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1999) (unpublished de-
cision).
206. Id. at *2.
207. Id.
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. at *6-7 (citing Jensen Press v. Ale, 336 S.E.2d 522, 524 (1985)).
210. Id. at *7.
211. 49 Va. Cir. 494 (Cir. Ct. 1999) (Henrico County).
212. Id. at 497.
213. Id.
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so as to constitute a "collateral source" to the plaintiff.214 Also, the
circuit court stated that the plaintiff cannot introduce an amount
for which she is not responsible to pay as an expense.215
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
The Commonwealth's administrative agencies promulgated
three key sets of final regulations during the past year: require-
ments for independent external review of health plan denials,
managed care quality assurance regulations, and Medicaid hos-
pice benefit regulations.
A. Independent External Review of Health Claim Denials
The State Corporation Commission Bureau of Insurance prom-
ulgated final regulations to carry out the provisions of Virginia's
Independent External Review of Adverse Utilization Review De-
cisions Law.216 The provisions of the regulation establish the pro-
cess for appeals to the Bureau of Insurance to obtain an inde-
pendent external review of a final adverse determination made by
or on behalf of a managed care health insurance plan.21 7 In order
to be eligible for an appeal, such a decision of a managed care in-
surance plan, or a utilization review agent acting on behalf of a
plan, must meet the following criteria: (1) the appeal must in-
volve health care services which cost more than $500; (2) the per-
son who filed the appeal must be a covered person under the plan
at the time of the disputed services; (3) the available internal ap-
peals procedures must have been exhausted (with some exception
for emergency situations); and (4) the appellant must have com-
pleted the appeal form and filed it with the Bureau of Insur-
ance.21 1 Services or items which are excluded from coverage under
the plan pursuant to an evidence of coverage or other member
materials are not subject to the appeal process.21 9
The regulations outline two sets of procedures-one for stan-
214. Id.
215. Id. (citing Sykes v. Brown, 156 Va. 881, 159 S.E. 202 (1931)).
216. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5900 to -5905 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
217. 14 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-215-50 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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dard appeals and one for expedited appeals."' Expedited appeals
are those appeals that involve emergency health care and, as a
result, must be decided within a shorter time frame than is nor-
mally allowed for a standard appeal.22' The regulations define
"[elmergency health care" as "health care items and medical
services furnished or required to evaluate and treat an emergency
medical condition."222
Once the Bureau of Insurance accepts an appeal for review, it
is assigned to an impartial health entity for actual review and de-
cision on the appeal. 223 The Bureau of Insurance is required by
the law to contract with impartial health entities to conduct the
appeals process and make determinations regarding appeals.2
The regulation outlines the standards that these entities must
meet in order to be considered for a contract as an impartial
health entity.225 These standards require that the impartial
health entity have: (1) a quality assurance mechanism in place to
ensure appeals are timely and properly conducted; (2) a process
for selecting qualified and impartial clinical peer reviewers to
conduct reviews; (3) procedures to ensure confidentiality of rec-
ords; (4) ensured that the entity has no affiliation with a health
plan, health plan association or professional association of pro-
viders; and (5) a process to ensure for each specific review that
the entity and reviewer do not have any conflict of interest aris-
ing from association with the appellant, treating provider, utiliza-
tion review entity making the adverse determination or other in-
volved party (i.e., facility where treatment is proposed).226
B. Managed Care Plan Quality Assurance
The General Assembly passed a law in 1998 establishing a
quality assurance certification program for managed care health
insurance programs.227 This past year, final regulations were
promulgated to carry out the provisions of that law.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 5-215-30 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
223. Id. at 5-215-70 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
224. Id. at 5-215-60 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
225. Id. at 5-215-110 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
226. Id.
227. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-137.1 to -137.6 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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The extensive regulations provide that all licensed managed
care health insurance plans must obtain a quality assurance cer-
tification from the Department of Health.228 The plans must re-
new this certification biennially.229 The purpose of the certifica-
tion is to ensure the quality of health care services delivered by
these organizations. Accreditation by a national accrediting body
may be used, in lieu of a comprehensive on-site examination by
the Department of Health, to meet the certification requirements
of the regulation."0
The regulation sets forth certification standards for managed
care plans in a wide variety of areas. These areas include pro-
vider credentialing, complaint systems, enrollee education and
communication, data management, medical records, continuity
and coordination of care, and utilization review management
among others.23
C. Hospice Benefits under Medicaid
The Department of Medical Assistance Services published final
regulations regarding hospice benefits under the state Medicaid
program. 2 The stated purpose of the regulations is to align the
coverage of hospice services under the state Medicaid program
with the standards applied to hospice benefits under the federal
Medicare programY3
Hospice services are a range of health care services for the use
of individuals with terminal illnesses and their families. In order
to qualify for hospice services, an individual must be terminally
ill with a life expectancy of six months or less. 4 The covered
services range from physician and inpatient hospital care, to so-
cial work and counseling on issues of bereavement, diet, and
spiritual matters related to end-of-life care and dying.23 5 The hos-
228. See 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-408-10 to -370 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
229. Id. at 5-408-30 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
230. Id. at 5-408-50 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
231. 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-408-160 (Cum. Supp. 2000).
232. State Plan for Medical Assistance Services Relating to Hospice Services, 16 Va.
Regs. Reg. 706 (Dec. 6, 1999) (to be codified at 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-50-270).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 707 (to be codified at 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-50-270(c)(4)).
235. Id. at 706-07 (to be codified at 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-50-270(c)).
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pice must provide directly certain services designated as "core
services."236 The core services include nursing care, social work,
and the counseling services.237 The remaining services may either
be provided directly by the hospice or contracted out to other pro-
viders.238
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the breadth of topics discussed in this article,
health law in Virginia continues to evolve in a rapid and dynamic
fashion in all three major legal arenas and in a wide variety of
areas of public policy and law which collectively comprise the
field of "health law." While the bulk of changes in the Common-
wealth's health law continue to come from the General Assembly,
the courts and administrative agencies also contribute signifi-
cantly to the evolution of health law in Virginia, as demonstrated
by the key judicial decisions and regulatory enactments discussed
above. Additionally, as demonstrated by the fact that key pieces
of legislation, dealing with such important issues as confidential-
ity of medical records and abortion, were carried over to the next
session, health law will continue to undergo significant changes
affecting all segments of the Commonwealth's population in the
coming year and beyond.
236. Id. at 706 (to be codified at 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 30-50-270(c)).
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